1. Appeal from Denial of Summary Judgment
National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Capital Properties, Inc., 88 A.3d 1050 (R.I. 2014): In National Refrigeration, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s appeal from the denial of its motion for summary judgment was not properly before the Court. In so holding, the Supreme Court reminded that “[b]ecause an order denying a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory determination and is not entitled to an appeal of right, [the Court does] not generally review such a denial.” (quoting McKinnon v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Nat’l Bank, 713 A.2d 245, 247 (R.I. 1998)). The plaintiff argued that because the denial of the motion for summary judgment was coupled with a cross-appeal, the appeal of the denial was properly before the Court. The Court disagreed, concluding that the denial of the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was not a final judgment and, therefore, it was not properly before the Court.
2. Appeal from Denial of Motion for Leave to Amend
Cayer v. Cox Rhode Island Telecom, LLC, 85 A.3d 1140 (R.I. 2014): In Cayer, after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants, it granted that defendant’s motion for a Rule 54(b) judgment. The plaintiff, in turn, plaintiff moved for leave to amend her complaint to include a claim against another party. The trial court denied that motion and the plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s appeal was interlocutory and, therefore, not properly before the Court. In so holding, the Court recognized that generally, interlocutory orders are not subject to review unless (1) “the order or decree falls within one of the exceptions set forth in G.L. 1956 § 9-24-7” or (2) the “order [falls] within the ambit of [the McAuslan Doctrine, a] judicially created rule that permits review of an interlocutory order that has such an element of finality as to require immediate review by [the Supreme Court] to avoid possible injurious consequences.” For purposes of the McAuslan Doctrine, consequences are injurious “when their occurrence is imminent and the damage they will work irreparable.”
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court concluded that the denial of the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend did not fall within either exception and, accordingly, the Court declined to entertain it.
3. The McAuslan Doctrine
Coit v. Tillinghast, 91 A.3d 838 (R.I. 2014): Interlocutory orders “‘are those that are provisional or temporary, or that decide some immediate point or matter but are not a final decision on the whole matter.’” (quoting Simpson v. Vose, 702 A.2d 1176, 1177 (R.I. 1997)). It has long been settled that interlocutory orders, generally are not subject to immediate appellate review unless the order or decree falls within one of the statutory exceptions to the final judgment rule. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-24-7)).
In Coit, the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed a second, long-established judicial exception to the general rule that interlocutory orders are not subject to appellate review. First recognized by the Supreme Court in McAuslan v. McAuslan, 83 A. 837, 841 (R.I. 1912), the McAuslan Doctrine provides that an interlocutory order may be reviewed before a case has concluded when the order “‘has such an element of finality as to require immediate review by [the Supreme] Court to avoid possible injurious consequences.’” (quoting Chiaradio v. Falck, 794 A.2d 494, 496 (R.I. 2002)). Such a judicially crafted exception is designed to prevent clearly imminent and irreparable harm that would otherwise result if judicial review was not available. Town of Lincoln v. Cournoyer, 375 A.2d 410, 412-13 (R.I. 1977).
4. The McAuslan Doctrine – Doctrine Applied
Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC, 85 A.3d 1147 (R.I. 2014): There has long been confusion over whether the McAuslan Doctrine should be invoked in the context of a direct appeal or a petition for writ of certiorari. While the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not directly address that issue in Weeks, its decision strongly suggests that the doctrine may be invoked in the context of a direct appeal.
In Weeks, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s appeal was interlocutory in nature and should be dismissed because the plaintiff chose to file a direct appeal instead of filing a petition for writ of certiorari. Although recognizing that as a general rule, appeals from interlocutory orders are not permitted, the Supreme Court noted that interlocutory appeals are permitted if they are all within the McAuslan Doctrine. Under the McAuslan Doctrine, the Court will permit appellate review of “an order or decree which, although in a strict sense interlocutory, does possess such an element of finality that action is called for before the case is finally terminated in order to prevent clearly imminent and irreparable harm.” (quoting Town of Lincoln v. Cournoyer, 375 A.2d 410, 412-13 (R.I. 1977). If the Court deems the appeal appropriate under McAuslan, it will treat it as a final order.
Applying the McAuslan Doctrine, the Court held that although the trial justice’s order directing the parties to resolve their dispute through binding arbitration was interlocutory in nature, the plaintiff’s appeal was proper under McAuslan.
5. Issues Concerning Finality Raised at Prebriefing Conference
Coit v. Tillinghast, 91 A.3d 838 (R.I. 2014): The Rhode Island Supreme Court often will raise issues related to the permissibility of an appeal during the required prebriefing conference. In Coit, the Court raised issue concerning the interlocutory nature of the appeal during the prebriefing conference and directed the parties to file supplemental memoranda addressing whether the order from which the appeal was taken was interlocutory.
